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For decades, parts of the literature on human culture have been gripped by an
analogy: culture changes in a way that is substantially isomorphic to genetic
evolution. This leads to a number of sub-claims: that design-like properties
in cultural traditions should be explained in a parallel way to the design-like
features of organisms, namely with reference to selection; that culture is a
system of inheritance; and that cultural evolutionary processes can produce
adaptation in the genetic sense. The Price equation provides a minimal
description of any evolutionary system, and a method for identifying the
action of selection. As such, it helps clarify some of these claims about culture
conceptually. Looking closely through the lens of the Price equation, the differ-
ences between genes and culture come into sharp relief. Culture is only a
systemof inheritancemetaphorically, or as an idealization, and the idealization
may lead us to overlook causally important features of how cultural influence
works. Design-like properties in cultural systems may owe more to trans-
mission biases than to cultural selection. Where culture enhances genetic
fitness, it is ambiguous whether what is doing the work is cultural trans-
mission, or just the genetically evolved properties of the mind. I conclude
that there are costs to trying to press culture into a template based on
Darwinian evolution, even if one broadens the definition of ‘Darwinian’.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Fifty years of the Price equation’.1. Introduction: the culture debates
Some aspects of human behaviour are not direct consequences of genotype,
and yet their properties seem to require appeal to something more than just
idiosyncratic learning. For example, a person of Japanese descent growing up
in California acquires Californian English, while her cousin in Japan acquires
Japanese. We can obviously dismiss genetics as the cause of the difference in out-
come. We correctly invoke learning instead. However, both Californian English
and Japanese have super-individual, lineage-like properties not shared by other
cases of learning. They have recurrent features that span many people and several
lifetimes; there is both a chain of inter-personal continuity, and gradual change
over time. Given this combination of super-generational continuity and gradual
change, it is unsurprising that scholars have often turned to Darwinian evolution
for paradigmatic metaphors. Culture appears to show Darwinian properties:
something is inherited; something varies; and then there is differential prolifer-
ation and survival. The result is a changing population distribution of cultural
items over time. Inspired by this isomorphism, Darwinian evolutionary models
of culture were developed in earnest in the late twentieth century [1–4]. Though
these models vary in how culture was conceptualized—in particular, how tight
a similarity between the genetic and cultural cases is prescribed—they share
enough in common to refer to them, henceforth, as cultural evolutionary theory.
A number of statements are made recurrently in summarizing the cultural
evolutionary theory. One is that culture is a system of inheritance. Thus,
set a set d
Figure 1. Schematic of the conditions required to apply the Price equation.
There are two sets of individuals, a and d, and some trait measurable on each
individual. There are directed links from some individuals in set a to those in
set d, which represent influence on the value of the trait. Fitness is defined,
for individuals in set a, as the number of outgoing links. The trait values of
the individuals in set d may or may not be equal to the average of the
individuals they receive links from. (Online version in colour.)
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2humans have not just the standard one system of inheritance
(genetics), but (at least) a second one: culture [5]. We have, in
other words, a dual inheritance [3], and two inheritance sys-
tems entails two distinct fitnesses: genetic fitness and cultural
fitness. Another statement is that cultural evolution produces
design-like properties that would not emerge without it [6,7].
The key insight of Darwinian genetic evolutionary theory
was that design-like properties could be produced, over time,
by selection processes. Thus, it is quite natural, seeing
design-like properties in culture, to assume they must be pro-
duced by selection processes too. Still another generalization
is that cultural evolution can increase genetic fitness. For
example, this claim is implicit in the idea that having a
second inheritance system is adaptive for copingwith environ-
mental fluctuations faster than those that can be tracked by
genetic selection, but slower than those generally tracked by
individual learning (see e.g. [8]). ‘Adaptive’ in this context
means genetically adaptive—more survival, more babies—
and so for the claim to work, cultural evolution would have
not only to increase cultural fitness, but genetic fitness too.
Cultural evolutionary ideas have been very influential, so
much so that they are cited as a paradigm of what successful
theory-building looks like [9], or drawn on in pursuit of other
explanatory targets [10]. Yet at the same time, all of the main
conceptual moves involved in likening cultural evolution to
genetic evolution have always been [11], and continue to be
[12–20], vigorously questioned. Some authors have sought to
hang on to isomorphism in the face of the challenges. For
example, they argue that the problematic features can be accom-
modated, since cultural evolutionary theory always admitted of
differences between the cultural and genetic cases [21]. Others
have argued that even though the analogy breaks down at
the micro-evolutionary level (coming to hold an idea is not
much like inheriting the short allele of the SL6CA4 gene), the
parallel might work reasonably well at more macroscopic
scales, where the details of the micro-mechanisms of trans-
mission drop out of central relevance [19]. Still others have
tried to retain the claim that cultural evolution is Darwinian
by broadening the scope of the term ‘Darwinian’ [12].
This paper does not presume to adjudicate between com-
peting claims about what if anything culture is, or how it
should be treated in our accounts of human behaviour. What
it will try to do is clarify some of the conceptual questions
involved: what would have to be true for culture to constitute
a system of inheritance; for design-like features of culture to be
explained by selection; for cultural evolution to increase genetic
fitness; and for cultural evolution to be Darwinian? A useful
lens for conceptual clarification is the Price equation, which is
what links this contribution to the others in this issue. The
Price equation can be stated in various forms, with varying
degrees of abstraction (see [22]). In its most abstract form,
it offers a minimal description of an evolutionary system,
and a way identifying how much of the change within it is
owing to selection. Price predicted that a general mathematics
of selection, to which his equation was an initial offering,
would be equally applicable to genetic and to other kinds of
system [23]. This leads naturally to its application to culture
[24]. I will use a toy example of the cultural evolution of song,
but the reader may substitute any other cultural example they
prefer (the example is loosely motivated by empirical research
in the cultural evolution of music [25,26]). In §2, I explain
what the Price equation looks like for our cultural example.
In §3, I turn to some contentious issues that the Price equationhelps clarify: when directional change is owing to selection
(§3.1); when and why culture could increase genetic fitness
(§3.2); and whether culture is a system of inheritance (§3.3).
Section 4 returns, in the light of §§2 and 3, to whether cultural
evolution is best thought of as a Darwinian process.2. The Price equation: a cultural application
If the Price equation is just an equivalence, or tautology, then
why am I so enthusiastic about it?
[22, p. 1017].To apply the Price equation, there need to be two sets of indi-
viduals: the first set (a) forms the ancestral generation, and the
second set (d), the descendant generation (figure 1). Each
member of sets a and d must have a particular value of the
trait for which the equation is to be constructed, in our case
song style. Let us assume that every individual sings, and
that their individual song style can be placed on a continuum
describing the entropy of that song style. In a high-entropy
song style, many different pitch transitions occur and there
are many different note durations, and phrases do not repeat.
It is thus very hard to predict either the pitch or duration of
the next note from the context. In a low-entropy song style, a
smaller set of pitch transitions and note durations is used,
and whole phrases repeat. Hence, low-entropy songs are
much easier to sing and learn. Low-entropy songs appear
well designed for humans to acquire. We denote the entropy of
the ith individual’s song style zi.
Theremust be directed links from some individuals in the a-
set to some in the d-set (figure 1). Links represent influences in
song entropy going from the individual on the upstream end of
the link to the individual on the receiving end, owing to emula-
tion or learning. No genetic connections need to be assumed
between individuals in the two sets; there might or might not
be any. To apply the Price equation in its deterministic form
(see [27]), we need to possess full information about which
ancestors have influenced which descendants and how
strongly, and the trait values (the z) for all of the a-set and
all of the d-set. Note, therefore, that we can only apply the
equation numerically once the ancestor–descendant influence
has already happened and the phenotypes of the descendants
are set. We are not, in this exercise, predicting the future, nor
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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3inferring the change in a whole population from data on a
sample. Rather, we are producing an exact description of the
population change that has happened in a single generation.
As an exegetical simplification, Iwill assume that every descen-
dant has the same number of ancestors (say five), and that the
ancestors are all equally influential on the descendant’s trait
value. Neither of these assumptions is necessary (see [24] for
a fuller treatment), but they make the presentation easier.
With our information on ancestor–descendant links and
trait values in hand, there are several things we can do.
First, we can calculate the change in average song entropy
between the a-set and d-set. Denoting arithmetic mean with
an overbar, then in this one generation of evolutionary
change, average song entropy has changed by Dz ¼ zd  za.
We can also calculate the (cultural) fitness of each individual
in the a-set: this is the number of individuals that particular
ancestor influences in the d-set. Therefore, we just count up
the number of outgoing links from the ith individual to get
that individual’s fitness wi. Fitness is not defined for individ-
uals in the d-set: that would require another set who learned
from d in their turn. Having calculated the fitness of each
a-individual, we could ask whether there is any relationship
between their song entropy and the fitness they ended
up achieving. Such an association is captured by the covari-
ance between ancestors’ song entropy and their fitnesses,
cov(w, z). A covariance is just an unstandardized correlation,
hence positive if those with higher-entropy songs had higher
fitness, negative if those with higher-entropy songs had lower
fitness and zero if there was no relationship at all between
song entropy and fitness. The existence of a non-zero covari-
ance between song entropy and fitness indicates that there is
selection on song entropy. It is not just a correlate of selection;
it is what it means for there to be selection [28].
A final thing we might wish to calculate is how the song
entropy of descendants relates to the song entropy of their
ancestors. There are several possibilities here. Each individual
in the d-set might have the average of the song entropies of
the individuals in the a-set that influenced them. If this were
the case, or even if there were some random noise, then, repre-
senting the difference in song entropy between ancestors and
their descendants as Dz, E(Dz) ¼ 0. On the other hand, in the
process of transmission, the trait values of the ancestors
might get transformed.When singing songs they have learned,
individuals might sometimes forget a few details of what they
heard, substituting a slightly more predictable pitch or dur-
ation (or even just repeating a whole phrase if they could not
remember the next one). In this case, then the songs they pro-
duce would, on average, have slightly lower entropy than the
ones to which they were exposed, and hence E(Dz) , 0. (One
could also imagine scenarios where E(Dz) . 0, where each
singer elaborates on learned song forms to impress their
friends. The direction of the transformation is unimportant
for the conceptual point.) E(Dz) is readily calculable with the
information we have already discussed.
One version of the Price equation for this scenario is
wDz ¼ cov(w, z)þ Ew(Dz) ð2:1Þ
Here, w is the average fitness of ancestors across the whole
population (effectively this is just a normalizing constant, 5 in
this case) and Ew represents a fitness-weighted expectation,
rather than the simple expectation. On the left-hand side, we
have the change in song entropy from the a-set to the d-set
ðDzÞ. On the right-hand side, we have two terms: thecovariance between song entropy and fitness (the selection
term) and the expected value of the difference in song entropy
between a person in the d-set and their influencers in the a-set
(the average transmission term).
What have we achieved at this point? Both the left- and
right-hand sides of (2.1) consist of things wewere able to calcu-
late from the information we already possessed. The equation
thus does not estimate any currently unknown parameters,
still less make any predictions about the change in song
entropy likely to occur in the next cultural generation, for
whom the covariances and expectations might be different
(this is what is often referred to as the ‘dynamical insufficiency’
problem of the Price equation [22]). Thus, the right-hand side
simply represents the same information as the left-hand side
in a different format. This deflationary view is what motivates
the critique that the Price equation is trivial or useless in
practice [29].
This critique, however, misses the point. The Price equation
is, indeed, a mathematical tautology [22]. It does not predict
the change in song entropy from one generation to the next.
Instead, it merely shows that the change in song entropy can
always be rewritten as the sum of a covariance and an
expectation. This rewriting, while not producing any new
information, can be epistemically useful. On the left-hand
side, we can see whether there has been any evolutionary
change from one generation to the next in this particular
population. Until we perform the rewriting of the right-hand
side, we cannot see whether that change is owing to selection,
or to something else. Equation (2.1), by providing a general
decomposition of the sources of cultural evolutionary
change, can help us clarify some of the issues raised in §1.
The next section discusses how it does this.3. Conceptual issues in cultural evolution from
the perspective of the Price equation
(a) Are the design-like features in culture produced
by selection?
Imagine we make the observation that, in each successive
cultural generation of singers, the average entropy of songs
becomes lower. This goes on over many decades, to the point
where the distribution of song entropies is much too concen-
trated at the low end to be owing to chance. This is the
emergence, through evolution, of a design-like property: low-
entropysongs are easier for humans to retain andsing. Ingenetic
evolution, observing the gradual emergence of design-like prop-
erties such as a streamlined body shape in an aquatic animal,
researchers’ first intuition is to reach for selection as the relevant
explanatory construct. Cultural researchers, understandably, are
tempted by similar moves. If the population becomes increas-
ingly dominated by low-entropy songs, then it seems like there
must have been cultural selection for low entropy over the gen-
erations (an assumption embodied, for example, byMacCallum
et al. [26]). Darwin himself was tempted by such a move, claim-
ing inawidely citedpassage inTheDescent ofMan (p. 90) that the
emergence of certain word forms in language change must be
owing to selection [30].
However, the appeal to selection is only sound for the gen-
etic evolutionary case because, there, the selection is the only
plausible source of the systematic change. In genetic biology,
faithful DNA replication, fair meiosis and the randomness of
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Figure 2. Simulations of change in the entropy of song style under three evolutionary scenarios. In each column (a–c), the main plot shows the change in the
population mean of the entropy of song styles over 20 generations. The bottom left inset shows the covariance between fitness (number of learners each ancestor
attracts) and entropy. The bottom right shows the mean value of the entropy difference between a descendant’s productions and the average of those of their
ancestors. Panels (a–c) correspond, respectively, to the three scenarios explained in §3a. All simulations are based on a population size of 1000, with each des-
cendant learning from five ancestors.
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4mutationwith respect to function ensure that, except for special
cases, the average transmission term on the right-hand side
of the Price equation is zero; it drops out. What we are left
with is directional change in phenotype implying selection,
and selection implying directional change in phenotype.
In the cultural case, however, we cannot so easily write off
the average transmission term. Humans have learning biases,
attentional limitations, non-zero priors, memorial foibles,
deliberate strategies and so on. Thus, in general, people will
produce things that are not just different from the sum of
things they learned, but different in consistent directions.
Change through average transmission is almost guaranteed
to be more important in the cultural than the genetic case, for
two related reasons. First, the proper function of DNA replica-
tion mechanisms is to replicate, and they do so indifferently to
the content of the message they are replicating (they are, for
example, indifferent between different nucleotide bases, and
to whether the sequence they are replicating will ever be tran-
scribed). The same cannot be said of humans: they replicate
culture, if they do so at all, usually in the course of achieving
a wide range of other purposes, other purposes that usually
prescribe or favour transformation [20]. Second, replication
is, in the genetic case, direct: an actual physical copy of a mol-
ecule is made. In the case of cultural contents, replication or
transmission are only metaphors for processes that are actually
indirect [18]. Someone in set a produces an action or artefact in
the public sphere. Another person in set d perceives and
appraises this, making use of inferential and other cognitive
abilities, and this affects their internal cognitive states. They
may then later produce an act or artefact of their own,
guided by those cognitive states and hence indirectly by the
prior action or artefact. This action or artefact is not, under
any circumstances, a physical copy of the earlier act or artefact.
Inferential and other cognitive mechanisms have intervened.
DNA replication intervenes in genetic transmission, of
course, but the effects of its intervention can be captured formany purposes with a very thin description: basically, it just
replicates the molecule. The parallel thin description for
human agents—basically, they just copy—is less likely ever
to be adequate.
Once we have non-zero average transmission, the Price
equation tells us that selection alone does not determine the
rate or even the direction of evolutionary change. To make
this point, figure 2 shows simulated populations of 1000 sing-
ers over 20 non-overlapping cultural generations, under three
evolutionary scenarios (see electronic supplementary material
for simulation methods and code). In all scenarios, each
singer in the new generation samples five singers to learn
from in the previous generation. In the first scenario (column
(a) of figure 2), sampling is related to the entropy of that indi-
vidual’s song: those with lower-entropy songs attract more
learners. For this reason, there is a consistently negative covari-
ance between song entropy and fitness (lower left panel). The
scenario also assumes that the entropy of a learner’s song is
on average just the same as those from whom they learned
(hence an average transmission term around zero, lower
right). The effect is that the entropy of song systems reduces
over the cultural generations (main panel of column (a)). This
reduction is owing to cultural selection, exactly because the
covariance term of the Price equation is consistently negative.
In the second scenario (column (b)), learners choosewho to
learn from entirely at random, with no consistent relation
to their teachers’ entropy. Hence, the covariance terms tend
to hover around zero. However, through their memorial
lapses and spontaneous regularizations, learners tend to pro-
duce songs with entropy that is just slightly lower than their
models; hence the consistently negative average transmission
terms. The consequence is a sustained reduction, over the
generations, in song entropy.
Finally, in the third scenario (column (c)), there are two
forces. Singers whose song entropy is high attain virtuosic
prestige. Their song styles are considered refined owing to
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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5their sophistication. More prestigious singers recruit more lear-
ners, generating a positive covariance between entropy and
fitness. However, learners do not manage to perfectly repro-
duce the entropy of their virtuosic teachers; they forget some
of the surprising transitions and changes in pattern, filling in
with something more obvious, and thus producing songs
lower in entropy than those they were trying to emulate.
What happens over the generations is a sustained reduction
in song entropy, despite selection for it to increase. The covari-
ances (bottom left for each figure part in figure 2) are
consistently positive, but they are coupled with even larger
negative expectation terms (bottom right). Since the Price
equation is just a sum, the term with the larger absolute
magnitude is the one that wins out.
Themoral of this story is that, in the cultural case, wherewe
observe directional change towards traits that appear well-
designed for human use, we cannot infer that cultural selection
is responsible. The threemain plots of figure 2 look almost iden-
tical, but in the first, the selection is the explanation; in the
second, there is no selection; and in the third, there is ongoing
selection in the opposite direction. This makes problematic the
argument that we can adapt the population-level ‘tests’ used
to identify genetic selection in natural populations to infer the
operation of selection processes in the cultural domain (see [7]
for a discussion). Since average transmission terms in cultural
evolution are likely to be non-zero, the mere observation of
apparent design, ordirectional changeover time, is inconclusive
asto the forceproducing it. Likewise,we cannot assumethat cul-
tural evolutionary processesmaximize cultural fitness, whereas
the parallel assumption for genetic evolution is generally safer
[24]. The operation of selection could only be identified, in the
cultural domain, if cultural fitness and hence its covariance
with trait values couldactuallybemeasured.This isnot straight-
forward, since identifying and quantifying cultural influence
are not nearly as simple as counting genetic offspring, which
evolutionary biologists do routinely (see §4 and [12,24]).
The fact that non-random cultural change might represent
transmission or selection, or any combination of the two, has
been well made before [31]. However, the Price equation, with
its separation of change into two additive terms on the right-
hand side, makes it particularly clear what the driving forces
are. In historical case studies (e.g. [32]), it is easier to detect direc-
tional cultural change than it is to definitely assign it to either
selection or transmission. There are only a few cases where
researchers have designed paradigms that isolate one force. For
example, one can compare MacCallum’s [26] public music
choice experiment, which allowed selection among computer-
generated tunes but no average transmission bias, with
Ravignani and Delgado’s transmission experiment, which
allowedbias in transmissionbutnoselection[25]. Inboth studies,
sustained non-random change was observed, in the direction of
features that recur in human musical traditions. Eriksson and
Coultas [33] investigated thedirectional emergence ofdisgusting
content in transmitted stories. They isolated average trans-
mission (the difference between the story a participant received
and the version they subsequently produced) and selection
(which of several stories a participant chose to read), and
showed that both were biased toward the stories with higher-
disgust content. (Confusingly, the authors refer to these two
forces as two phases of cultural selection, though one is clearly
average transmission rather than selection.)
These examples suggest that design in cultural evolution
is produced by both transmission and selection. Theirimportance may not be equal, however. Experimental work
using iterated learning, or transmission chain designs suggests
a very large role for average transmission. In these experiments,
one participant receives a stimulus (for example, a story), and
after a short delay reproduces it. The next participant receives
the first participant’s output, and so on in chain-like fashion.
There can be no selection in iterated learning experiments:
the fitness of every ancestor is identical (one descendant).
The results show, first, that transformation effects are very
large. People do not faithfully replicate; so much so that
within a few generations, the resulting product often bears
little relation to its founding ancestor [34]. Second, trans-
formation effects occur not at random, but in systematic
directions; so there is evolution in the absence of selection.
Third, most importantly, non-obvious design-like features of
human cultural systems emerge in these experiments, quite
quickly and without apparently being strongly seeded by the
experimenters. Examples include aspects of language structure
such as compositionality, grammatical regularity and animacy
distinctions [35–37]; conceptual categorization imposed on
underlying continua [38]; the rhythmic universals observed
in music [25], verse-metre conventions [39] and simplifications
of cause–effect relations [34].
If we accept the validity of these laboratory scenarios as
models of naturally occurring cultural processes, the findings
pose a challenge. If it is possible to generate so many of cul-
ture’s non-random properties without allowing for any
selection, then how important is selection for explaining
patterns of culture? If the transmission is doing most of the
work, then the rhetorical grip of the genes–culture analogy is
loosened; cultural evolution is just like genetic evolution
except that the design-like properties mostly arise for a
different reason. I return to this issue in §4.(b) When does culture produce genetic adaptation?
There is a Manichaean tendency within the cultural evolution
literature. On the one hand, it is clearly understood that cul-
tural fitness is to do with one’s ability to influence the
cultural contents of minds in the future generation, and as
such has nothing necessarily to do with number of biological
offspring. On the other hand, it is often asserted that culture
is an adaptive capacity, and that through it humans have
been able to survive and proliferate better than they otherwise
would. This implies that researchers believe cultural evolution-
ary processes can have an impact on genetic fitness. The Price
equation is useful for specifying under what conditions this
will happen.
A simple way of doing this is to construct a trait g that
describes ‘doing all the things that, in this environment,
lead to high genetic reproductive success’. What will be the
impact of cultural evolutionary processes on the population
mean of g? From equation (2.1), we have
wDg ¼ cov(w, g)þ Ew(Dg) ð3:1Þ
A covariance can be rewritten as the product of a variance
and a regression coefficient, giving
wDg ¼ b(w, g)var(g)þ Ew(Dg) ð3:2Þ
Here, b(w, g) is the regression coefficient of genetic-fitness-
maximizing-behaviour on cultural fitness; effectively the
correlation between social influence and lifetime reproductive
success. If this coefficient is positive, then (in the absence of a
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lead to the behaviours that produce higher genetic fitness
becoming more widespread. Population mean genetic fitness
will increase. A positive coefficient could arise through biases
to emulate just those individuals who are successful in some
genetically relevant way, like surviving or attaining status or
resources [3]. However, negative coefficients could also occur.
If there is a strong trade-off between becoming socially presti-
gious and having children, as may be the case for example for
career success in modern industrial societies, then b(w, g)
becomes negative and cultural selection will reduce genetic
mean fitness. This is a candidate explanation for the historical
emergence of small family sizes (see [3, pp. 199–221]).
The Price equation lets us see that there is also another path-
way for cultural evolution to increase genetic fitness. Biased
average transmission (the second term on the right-hand side
of (3.2)) can also produce directional changes in genetic fitness.
If humans have predispositions or priors concerning certain
behaviours, because those behaviours have usually been geneti-
cally fitness-enhancing over evolutionary time, or just the
ability to learn from consequences, then the effect will be to
shift average cultural practices in the direction that increases
genetic fitness. Biased average transmission, in effect, provides
a universal force of attraction towards practices of the kinds that
work adaptively over evolutionary time, or at least, a source of
resistance against cultural practices that are too outlandish from
the perspective of past genetic fitness. Biased average trans-
mission means, in effect, that although patterns of culture end
up containing practices that are good for genetic fitness, it is
not cultural evolution that is doing the fitness-enhancing
work; it is prior genetic selection on the cognitive mechanisms
that transform culture. Culture effectively drops out of the
equation, an intermediate variable between the adaptive beha-
viours and their true organizational source [40]. Much of the
debate between cultural evolutionary theory on the one hand
and evolutionary psychology on the other, through the
window of the Price equation, is a debate about whether the
first or second term on the right-hand side of (3.2) is more
important in explaining patterned human behaviour.(c) Can culture be said to be a system of inheritance?
The Price equation is usually thought of as defining the
conditions for selection to be an evolutionary force. However,
it also offers conditions for being able to describe a system as
involving inheritance. In figure 1, there is inheritance for two
reasons. First, the links from a to d are directed; there are no
links back from d to a. Second, it is possible to index which
members of d were influenced by a, and how strongly. With-
out these two conditions being met, it is hard to think of the
system as involving inheritance and, relatedly, the whole
notion of fitness ceases to be well defined—in the terms of
[19], there would be no Darwinian individuals.
It is not clear that figure 1 captures cultural processes
between people. Person A suggests an idea for a theory;
person B thinks about this idea, writes a draft paper and
sends it back to A. A reads it and realizes that the theory
needs revision. A tells B this in an email and B sees A’s
point, changing her presentation of the theory in a subsequent
talk. Though there is clearly social influence in this scenario,
there is no inheritance, exactly because the link is bi-directional.
Hence, there is no simple measure of the cultural fitness of an
individual. A and B influenced one another repeatedly in thecourse of coming to hold certain cognitive representations.
(‘Horizontal transmission’, a building block of cultural evol-
utionary theory, does not describe this situation, but rather,
unidirectional influence from an ancestor to a descendant
who is not a genetic relative.)
The issue is obvious once pointed out. So how does cultural
evolutionary theory deal with it? Classic dual-inheritance
models [3] make the idealization that cultural traits are only
transmitted once in the human lifetime. Cognitive transform-
ation is applied to whatever content is acquired (this is referred
to as ‘guided variation’). However, this happens only once the
transmittedmaterial is safely inside the receivingmind. Thepro-
cess of transmission between minds happens just once for all
time, with no negotiation and no back-flow. This idealization
is what makes the concept of inheritance, and much of the
machinery of population genetic modelling, applicable.
Theremaywell be cultural cases forwhich the idealization is
adequate. The phonemic contrasts of a native language are
acquired early in life and may not be much changed thereafter.
Moreover, theyare acquiredwithout anyback-and-forth reason-
ing or debate. Thus, describing the phonemic contrast system of
a native language as something that is inherited might be
reasonable: before you are a fully competent speaker, you are
in descendant mode; and once you have learned, you become
available as a potential ancestor. It is not clear that the idealiz-
ation is adequate more generally, though. Skilled performance,
moral judgement and political preferences can change dramati-
cally over the course of an individual’s lifetime, exactly because
there is constant reshaping and discussion going on between
multiple individuals, none of whom is wholly an ancestor or
wholly a descendant. The transformative effects of human cog-
nition—that which in equation (2.1)we tried to capturewith the
average transmission term—are in fact produced in multiple
interactions across multiple minds. The problem with seeing
cultural influence as inheritance is that the social part gets
restricted to the once-in-a-lifetime, ancestor-to-descendant
transmission. The cognitive part gets restricted to the guided
variation individuals may apply within their own skulls.
What ismissing is the dialogic activity underlying the (constant,
ongoing, inter-personally negotiated) transformation of cultural
content. This dialogic part may matter for the most distinctive
aspects of human culture and institutions. It may turn out to
matter even in some cases that we usually think of as inheri-
tance. In Creole languages, for example, the lexicon and
phonology may be inherited in the sense outlined above. The
morphology, however, emerges through repeated interaction
between peers who have no inheritance to build on, but have
a mutual desire to communicate [41].
Once the possibilities of repeatedmutual influence and dia-
logue are admitted, simple notions like cultural fitness are no
longer calculable. The cultural traits that become prevalent in
the long term may not be those that attract the most learners
initially [16]. One could think, for example, of populist political
policies that are intuitively appealing on first hearing, but
fall apart themoment they are subjected to sustained argumen-
tation. Would they spread or not? It would depend on the
ratio of reasoned conversations to sound-bites in a particular
social network. Is the fitness associated with such ideas high
or low? It depends whether you measure, as fitness, the
initial attraction probability, or the resistance to abandonment
following argumentation; bothwill have an impact on the equi-
librium prevalence of the policies. In short, thinking of cultural
representations as being acquired through one-off inheritance
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for the structure and dynamics of cultural representations.
One move often made to salvage the idea of cultural influ-
ence as inheritance is to switch the individuals represented in
figure 1. For example, the individuals in d could be renditions
of a particular song, and the individuals in a could be earlier
song renditions. A relationship of inheritance would hold
from the earlier rendition to the later one influenced by it.
Fitness would be the sum of influence on future renditions of
a given earlier rendition. This works up to a point. Since later
renditions can only be affected by earlier ones, there are no
problems of bi-directionality. How useful this notion of inheri-
tance turns out to be still depends on how the transmission
works. If every rendition can be very clearly linked to a small
number of earlier renditions and not others, then ancestry
and descent are fairly clear. If, however, current renditions
are somewhat influenced, in different ways, by a very large
proportion of earlier ones within that social group, then the
ancestor–descendant metaphor loses utility. As Godfrey-
Smith puts it: if there are toomany parents, there are no parents
at all [19]. This is especially true where there is a large amount
of active reshaping of the transmitted material, and becomes
even more acute once we admit that song renditions can be
influenced by a potentially limitless set of things that are not
song renditions at all (e.g. films, world events, natural or indus-
trial sounds). Measuring fitness, even at the cultural-item level,
then becomes problematic.
Even if themove from people to song renditions as the Dar-
winian individuals proved fruitful, it would still be wrong to
claim that humans have a second system of inheritance run-
ning alongside the genetic one, or a dual inheritance. In the
rendition-as-individual idealization, humans are not inheritors
of culture. They are just the ecological background, providing
selection pressures on cultural renditions through their tastes
and propensities. We can retain the notion that humans are
the individuals whose phenotypes we are studying, but in
this case, we must recognize that their acquisition of culture
is not like the inheritance of their genes, and so they only
have a dual inheritance as a metaphor or idealization. Alterna-
tively, we canmove to modelling aworld where humans—one
type of Darwinian individual evolving with one system of
inheritance (genes)—are hosts and ecological backgrounds to
the propagation of another type of Darwinian individual
(song renditions), which also has one system of inheritance.4. Is cultural change Darwinian?
The considerations in §3 bring us back to an overall assess-
ment of whether cultural change is best thought of as a
Darwinian process. Space precludes a full review of all the
possible and actual answers (see [7,12,17,19–21]). These
depend on what scope we give the term ‘Darwinian’: we
can always define it in such a way as to include the key fea-
tures of a cultural case we are interested in. Thus, the question
is not whether we can say that cultural change is a Darwinian
process, but how epistemically useful such a stance is.
Cultural evolutionists have always stressed that cultural
transmission is not exactly like genetic transmission (see e.g.
[1,3,7,42]). Indeed, much of their work consists in documenting
the differences and suggesting how to model them. What
unites them is the notion that despite the differences, a parallel
with Darwin’s account of genetic evolution is still a helpfulstarting point. Another view is that the differences are so fun-
damental that we would do better to begin our study of
culture completely unencumbered by the analogy. As this
view has been less often defended than the other, I will briefly
summarize some arguments for it. We start by asking: what is
Darwinian about Darwin’s theory of genetic evolution?
For living things, there are unidirectional relationships of
ancestry and descent, as shown in figure 1. Themodes of ances-
tor–descendant relationships are stable and straightforward:
for us, for example, all descendants have exactly two parents,
weighted almost equally. For selection, and hence the Price
equation, to apply there need to be clearDarwinian individuals
with simple, unambiguous ancestor–descendant links: if there
are too many parents or their influence is obscure, there are no
parents at all. Let us call the presence of discrete individuals
with unidirectional, countable ancestor–descendant links the
Darwinian pre-requisite.
The Darwinian pre-requisite is necessary for Darwin’s
theory, but not sufficient to characterize it. Darwin worried
about the problem of design, namely where the non-random
functional characteristics of organisms had come from, but he
was by no means alone in suggesting they emerged gradually
through an evolutionary process. Others had done so too, but
in different ways. Prototypically non-Darwinian accounts, like
that of Lamarck, attributed the design-like properties to the aver-
age transmission term of the Price equation. Though Lamarck is
most associated in contemporary discourse with the inheritance
of acquired characteristics, there is a second important com-
ponent of his theory, that of mutation to address a felt need. In
other words, in Lamarckian evolution, directional changes
stem from the average transmission term: organisms systemati-
cally move their type in a non-random direction. Darwin’s
defining insight was that this was not necessary. The average
transmission term could be zero, and yet design-like properties
still emerge, driven by the selection component. This is not to
argue that Darwinian evolution admits of no forces other than
selection. It is to argue that Darwin, distinctively, accords a cen-
tral role to selection rather than transmission in explaining the
emergence of design-like properties.
Viewed in this light, it would seem reasonable to reserve
the category ‘Darwinian’ for cases where the Darwinian pre-
requisite is satisfied and there is a prominent role for selection
rather than transmission in explaining design-like properties.
One need not, perhaps, go so far as to refuse the designation
‘Darwinian evolution’ to all cases where the average trans-
mission term is non-zero. However, there is no doubt that
the success of Darwinian evolution as an explanatory para-
digm owes much to the fact that, in genetic cases, it has
generally turned out to be zero. The greater the importance
of average transmission in explaining design-like properties,
the less the similarity to Darwin’s theory becomes. One
could loosen one’s definition of ‘Darwinian’ to include such
cases (for example, calling all populational processes over
time ‘Darwinian’ [12]). However, any such broad notion of
‘Darwinian’ would also include accounts of the genetic evol-
utionary process that historians of science see as importantly
different from Darwin’s.
In this paper, I have drawn attention to key differences
between genetic and cultural processes: in culture, much of
the design work may be done by average transmission; ances-
tor to descendant relationships may not be straightforwardly
verifiable matters; and ‘inheritance’ followed by ‘mutation’ is
only a metaphor or idealization for a range of processes
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8occurring within and between minds (see also [43] for further
elaboration). This means that key concepts like fitness and
selection could be hard to measure in practice, and possibly
even undefined in theory. In view of this, there would seem
to be a reasonable case for not saddling ourselves with the ana-
logy to genetic evolution, but just making tools for the cultural
case that are grounded in the natural properties of that case.
This certainly does notmean that all the results of prior cultural
evolutionary work arewrong. Any attempt to model culture as
a populational phenomenon can lead to valid insights, even if
based on idealizations that are eventually discarded.Moreover,
as Godfrey-Smith points out [19], even if the genes–culture
analogy fails at the micro-evolutionary level, it can lead to
useful generalizations and methodological advances at more
macroscopic levels of analysis, such as that of language
phylogenies. Nonetheless, advances in understanding the
population distribution of cultural practices or representations
seem most likely to come from cognitive science: understand-
ing in detail what kinds of cognitive representations people
hold, what capacities and priors allow them to do this and
how social experience updates these representations. Such
understanding could build out from the properties of the indi-
vidual knower to the trait distributions arising in interacting
networks of individuals (see [44] for a promissory example).
No isomorphism to Darwinian evolution is required in order
to do this (see also [45]).
Perhaps it does not matter whether we adopt the genes–
culture analogy or not. One researcher starts from the
genes–culture analogy and progressively builds the differences
between genes and culture into her models. Another starts
from cognitive science with no Darwinian assumptions, and
builds up to populational phenomena. They may converge
on the same insights. However, foundational metaphors are
important for a number of reasons. First, they are pedagogi-
cally influential. When we explain our theories, we start with
‘culture is like genes’, and then add the nuances. People
forget or fail to hear the nuances; they only remember the fram-
ing, which they then either contest or apply too literally. Thus,
theories of culture whose first move is the analogy with
genes may be condemned forever to spend most of their time
re-explaining their spoken-but-not-heard nuances.
Second, foundational metaphors bias where we turn to,
seducing us down some paths and leading us to overlook
others. When we see design or directional change in culture,
we too readily reach for selection, since that is what ourfoundational metaphor makes most cognitively available.
Darwin did so, for word forms, and may well have been
wrong. We do not have the right intuitions for the importance
of transmission exactly because transmission is not what is
important in the genetic case. Likewise, the processes whereby
adult humans continually, mutually and reciprocally affect
each others’ behaviours and cognitive states, through mechan-
isms such as shared activity and argumentation, have been
paid too little attention in the cultural evolution literature.
This is because theydonot fitwith the simple concepts of inheri-
tance or mutation (see also [20]). A central critique of cultural
evolutionary theory, fromboth the anthropological and the cog-
nitive science perspectives [45,46], is that the description of
humans it assumes is too thin—they just imitate, and there is
not much more you need to know, except that their imitation
could be biased in a few simple ways. This follows directly
from the foundational metaphor, since a thin description—
they just replicate, plus a bit of mutation—works pretty well
for the genetic case.With a different, more realistic foundational
metaphor, perhaps we would move more quickly towards the-
ories that attribute the individual humans with more of the
thickness and complexity required for adequate accounts of
human behaviour.
Others have made these points before, and yet the hold of
the genes–culture analogy persists. Perhaps this is just because
it is simpler and more transmissible than the alternatives.
Darwin’s theory of genetic evolution is a very successful
theory, and people at least think they understand it (though
in fact they often do not [47,48]). Critiques of its application
to culture can seem tantamount to saying ‘it’s all very complex
and what happens depends on the details’. Hence, they are
relatively unattractive. But the case underlying them seems
strong: explaining culture involves all the problems of cogni-
tion (how do minds come to know and do the things they
know and do?) shackled to social science’s long-standing
micro–macro problem (how do the properties of indivi-
duals affect those of their social groups, and vice versa?). This
endeavour is not precisely analogous to any other.
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